One of the first tasks confronting a new prime minister, after an audience with the King, is to write a “letter of last resort”. Sir Keir Starmer will be asked to write to an (unnamed) commander of a Trident missile submarine on patrol in the Atlantic.
The letter might tell the commander, now uncontactable after a devastating strike on Britain, that the prime minister wished to retaliate by firing a nuclear weapon at the assumed attacker.
Starmer will be asked to write the letter after being “indoctrinated” by the chief of defence staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, who will explain precisely what damage a Trident missile could cause.
Each Trident submarine carries eight missiles with a maximum of 40 warheads, containing more firepower than all the bombs dropped in World War II, including those in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The missiles onboard a Trident submarine could directly cause more than 10 million civilian casualties, with huge disruption to the climate and global food supplies.
Starmer has to write the letter in his own hand, giving detailed instructions about what Britain’s response should be in the event of a pre-emptive nuclear attack on the country.
The letter would be opened by the submarine commander, who would have to conclude that the prime minister was no longer in a position personally to take command of the situation.
The options in the letter are said to include the orders: “Put yourself under the command of the US, if it is still there”; “Go to Australia”; “Retaliate”; or “Use your own judgment”.
The procedure is brilliantly exposed in David Greig’s play, The Letter of Last Resort. It is a conversation between a new prime minister and a senior government official.
The new PM: “Are you saying that in the end it all rests on what I write in this piece of paper now?”
Official: “Yes.”
PM: “To write ‘retaliate’ is monstrous and irrational. To write ‘don’t retaliate’ renders the whole nuclear project valueless”.
Official: “Yes.”
When Tony Blair was asked to write the letter after his 1997 election victory, he immediately went white. Lord Guthrie, his defence chief, said the briefing made Blair fall “quite quiet”.
Judging by his rhetoric, Starmer would be less anxious. Questioned on 3 June at a campaign hustings in the marginal town of Bury, Starmer said: “Of course I would be prepared to use” nuclear weapons.
Surrounded by candidates who were armed forces veterans, the Labour leader doubled down: “It’s a vital part of our defence. And of course, that means we have to be prepared to use it.”
This rhetoric reinforces his key message: the Labour Party has “changed”. His predecessor Jeremy Corbyn said he would instruct the Trident commander never to press the nuclear “red button”.
‘A monster’
Starmer may regret expressing such confidence in Trident. Not long ago, the top civil servant at the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Jon Thompson, told MPs that Trident was the project that most kept him awake at night.
It was “the single biggest future financial risk we face”, he said, adding: “The project is a monster”. He warned that it was an “incredibly complicated area to estimate future costs”.
Trident has been predicted to cost a total of more than £200 billion over a 30 year lifespan. The MoD has not challenged the figure and has never given any of its own estimates in public.
This raises a most serious question: far from enhancing the country’s national security, do nuclear weapons actually undermine it?
Trident’s growing cost threatens to overwhelm the entire British defence budget, diverting spending from cheaper conventional weapons systems, such as drones and air defence batteries.
Britain increased spending on nuclear weapons last year by 17 per cent to £6.5 billion, a greater rise than any other nuclear power except the US. Over the past five years, British expenditure rose by a staggering 43 per cent.
Trident now costs £12,000 every minute. The National Audit Office warnsthe cost to renew Britain’s arsenal will rise by more than £99 billion over the coming decade. Yet even these figures might be a fraction of the true cost.
Dominic Cummings, Boris Johnson’s onetime chief adviser, put it this way in a tweet: “All official budget numbers are 100% FAKE cos of the tens of billions in hidden classified budgets from the total shitshow of our nuclear weapons program over 20+ years. Fake budgets, fake debates, fake politics all the way down”.
More recently, Cummings claimed: “Our nuclear weapons infrastructure is dangerously rotting & is tens of billions secretly in the hole, with huge knock-on effects beyond its destructive effects on MoD which has got *even worse* & *even more lying* during the [Ukraine] war.”
He predicted that the “entire puerile election debate will be based on fake budget numbers that will then be given to Starmer on above-STRAP3 [highly classified] yellow paper, with him given the same nudge to classify, punt and lie. Nobody will report on all this & MPs will continue to ignore it…”
This conspiracy of silence is perhaps perpetuated because those charged with overseeing our nuclear arsenal are able to profit handsomely from it when they leave office. There’s an umbilical cord, or “revolving door”, between top security officials and the arms industry.
Chief among them is BAE Systems, which constructs the Trident submarines in Barrow-in-Furness. Their board includes Sir Mark Sedwill, who joined the company in 2022 shortly after he resigned as Britain’s most senior civil servant. Campaign Against Arms Trade found the company recruited dozens of former Whitehall staff, diplomats and ministers.
The special indulgence and absence of accountability surrounding nuclear weapons is reinforced by the lack of competition between arms companies like BAE, which effectively has a monopoly.
‘Towering achievement’
Yet none of these hidden costs or conflicts of interest appears to trouble the new prime minister. In a Daily Mail article, Starmer described the creation of Britain’s nuclear weapons programme as one of the “towering achievements” of Clement Attlee’s post-war Labour government, along with the NHS.
Attlee spent many millions of pounds developing Britain’s first nuclear bomb in a project he kept secret from most of his cabinet colleagues at a time when the country was technically bankrupt.
Then, as now, Britain could not afford both nuclear weapons and the NHS – yet voters were not offered the choice. “Nurses not nukes” could have been a compelling slogan, if the electorate knew what was going on.
The secrecy imposed by both Labour and Conservative governments about the development of nuclear weapons is exposed by a note Winston Churchill received from his scientific advisor Lord Cherwell in 1951.
“Concealment was certainly very necessary at the inception of atomic energy work”, Cherwell wrote. “And frankly I am agreeably surprised that the Socialist Government [ie Attlee’s] was sufficiently imaginative and patriotic to risk the parliamentary criticism to which this might expose them”.
Without an informed Cabinet, let alone electorate, to stop it, the first British atomic bomb was tested over the Monte Bello Islands in the Pacific Ocean in 1952. Five years later, Britain tested its first H-bomb on Christmas Island, an Australian territory in the Indian Ocean.
Service personnel charged with watching the explosions were not warned of the dangers of radiation, which can cause cancer, heart problems and birth defects. These veterans are still seeking compensation and their medical records.
In 1957, Aneurin Bevan, the architect of the NHS as health secretary but subsequently the shadow foreign secretary, successfully opposed a host of Labour Party motions calling for the end of Britain’s nuclear weapons project.
If passed, he said, Britain “would go naked into the conference chamber” – a reference to international meetings on defence and security. It was a striking, albeit misleading, metaphor, and one that has impressed governments ever since.
The Labour leadership’s support for the bomb was the catalyst for anti-war protests leading to annual Easter marches to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, Berkshire, and the foundation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).
It was also closely followed by the foundation of Britain’s “special relationship” with the US – the signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) between the two countries in 1958. The MDA, whose full contents remain secret, enshrines Britain’s reliance on the US for essential technology and material without which the Trident system would not function.
The agreement is incorporated in US law, yet despite its fundamental importance to Britain’s relations with its closest ally and its role in the world, it has no legal status in the UK.
It has never been the subject of a substantial debate or vote in parliament. It has to be renewed every decade, and will be again this year, probably in a discreet ceremony in Washington, but almost certainly without any meaningful debate in Britain.
Depopulation
The history of Britain’s nuclear arsenal reveals recurring and interlocking themes: the cost, the absolute reliance on the US – giving a lie to claims that the country’s nuclear “deterrent” is independent – and its credibility as a usable military weapon.
Britain’s dependency on the US has been repeatedly enshrined. President John F. Kennedy and prime minister Harold Macmillan negotiated a deal in 1962 for the US to supply Polaris nuclear missiles for British submarines.
The pact, drawn up in the Bahamas, was further evidence of Britain’s dependence on the US. France’s president, Charles de Gaulle, said it was the main reason he vetoed Britain’s membership of the European Economic Community the following year.
The return of a Labour government in 1964 – after thirteen years of Conservative rule – posed no threat to the deepening ties between Britain and America over nuclear weapons. Far from it.
Soon after he became prime minister, Labour’s Harold Wilson secretly agreed to a US request to build a bomber base on Diego Garcia, the largest island of the Chagos archipelago in the British Indian Ocean Territory.
Some 1,500 islanders were forcibly displaced, many to Mauritius and Seychelles. In return, the Labour government secretly obtained a discount, believed to amount to around £200 million in today’s money, on the Polaris nuclear missile system.
The dispute over the status of the Chagos islands remains unresolved with Britain rejecting UN demands to let the islanders return home.
Wilson also secretly agreed to the Chevaline project, a scheme to make Polaris missiles more likely to penetrate Soviet air defences. Many senior Whitehall defence officials viewed this as an expensive and futile move.
They warned the technology was obsolete from the start, before Labour and Conservative governments wasted hundreds of millions of pounds on it. The Commons public accounts committee reported in 1982 that John Nott, Margaret Thatcher’s defence secretary, said Chevaline’s cost had “gone bananas”.
The project was in the control of unaccountable nuclear scientists, the committee reported. “Our criticism”, it added, “is that the costs were not disclosed, and that there was no requirement that they should be disclosed”.
Nothing has changed.
Thatcher and Blair
Before long, the US developed the Trident nuclear missile system as a successor to Polaris. If Britain wanted to maintain a nuclear arsenal of its own, it had no choice but to follow suit.
In 1980, a year after her election victory, Thatcher agreed to buy Trident missiles for British submarines. She did so without informing her cabinet. Documents released in 2011 revealed that two-thirds of the cabinet were opposed and even the chiefs of staff were divided.
Nott told Thatcher that a full debate on nuclear defence was essential in light of these divisions. Trade secretary John Biffen privately warned Thatcher not to underestimate the electoral damage the anti-nuclear movement could inflict. A women’s anti-nuclear camp had just been set up at Greenham Common, where US cruise missiles were due to be based and a CND rally attracted 250,000 people.
Thatcher’s cabinet secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, reassured her that when Macmillan negotiated the deal in the Bahamas with Kennedy to buy Polaris, the cabinet “ratified the decision and the agreement, but played no part in arriving at the original decision or in laying down the negotiating brief”.
He also reminded her that Wilson did not consult his cabinet in 1974 when he agreed to procure the Chevaline system. Thatcher received further support from her first foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, who told the cabinet: “Failure to acquire Trident would have left the French as the only nuclear power in Europe. This would be intolerable.”
That is a view still widely held in Westminster and Whitehall.
Blair had to rely on Conservative MPs in 2007 to pass a vote on replacing Britain’s existing Vanguard-class of nuclear-armed submarines. 88 Labour MPs disobeyed a three-line whip and voted against the government.
It was the biggest backbench rebellion since the 2003 vote on the invasion of Iraq. At stake was a new fleet of Dreadnought submarines, which would not enter service until the 2030s, and an upgraded version of the Trident missile.
Reflecting on that vote, Blair wrote in his autobiography, A Journey: “The expense is huge and the utility [of Trident is] non-existent in terms of military use”. Although Blair conceded the “common sense and practical argument” against Trident, in the end he thought giving it up would be “too big a downgrading of our status as a nation”.
Featured image: Trident missile via Wikimedia Commons and US Department of Defense; Second image: HMS Victorious near Faslane via defenceimagery.mod.uk OGL 1v
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