{"id":8122,"date":"2019-02-26T09:20:39","date_gmt":"2019-02-26T09:20:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/?p=8122"},"modified":"2019-02-26T16:23:04","modified_gmt":"2019-02-26T16:23:04","slug":"brexit-masks-a-multitude-of-national-identities","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/2019\/02\/brexit-masks-a-multitude-of-national-identities\/","title":{"rendered":"Brexit masks a multitude of national identities"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

As we try to make sense of the twists and turns of Brexit politics, Westminster can seem like Alice\u2019s Wonderland. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The mad riddle of Brexit, in its latest immediate version, is the obsessive concern for MPs and much of the media.  \u2018How long is forever?\u2019 Alice asked.  \u2018Sometimes just one second\u2019 replied the White Rabbit.  In radically uncertain and unsettled times, an academic perspective \u2013 stepping back and trying to frame the current drama in the longer-term \u2013 could add something different to the debate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Brexit processes have already reshaped territorial politics in the UK and changed its territorial constitution<\/a>.   Their dynamics deepen these territorial challenges.  Equally they also have deep roots, which certainly predate Brexit.  As well as running through the institutions and practices of UK territorial governance, EU membership has provided a kind of external support, a scaffold for the UK.  Even contemplating the removal of that scaffold has changed the way the UK is viewed.  While no particular outcome is inevitable, we should try to think through the tensions that run through the territorial constitution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Breakup Britain? <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

At its most dramatic, the UK may cease to exist \u2013 at least in its current territorial form.  The Westminster Government\u2019s commitment to protecting \u2018our precious Union\u2019 has to be set alongside its long-term position that the UK has no \u2018selfish interest\u2019 in keeping Northern Ireland<\/a> (NI) in the Union.  While demography need not define political destiny, demographic change is set to generate a Catholic-background majority in NI.  Brexit has also increased discussion of unification in the Republic of Ireland (which would also need to agree to it) and changed its tone. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Brexit might make life more challenging for any future independent Scotland.  Equally, Brexit politics and legislation has dramatised and deepened differences in how the territorial constitution is seen from Holyrood and Westminster.  Scotland\u2019s distinctive Remain majority did not generate an immediate fillip for independence.  Equally, Brexit has not produced a politics of rapprochement, either between Leavers and Remainers or across UK territorial politics.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

UK devolution has sought to compartmentalise powers \u2013 each level of government having its own areas of \u2018sole rule\u2019.  It has never a developed clear and robust framework for powers that are \u2018shared\u2019.   Relationships between London and the devolved governments are at best weakly institutionalised.  Brexit has placed the mundane routines of intergovernmental relations (IGR<\/a>) under further strain.  Some new relationships have developed under its pressure.  The larger story is of the basic fragility of UK IGR.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The same…only different <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Basic differences of identity underpin diverse responses to Brexit.  They also shape distinct visions of the constitution and approaches to IGR.  The BBC’s Mark Easton\u2019s large 2018 survey<\/a> showed that national identities are strong \u2013 and multiple \u2013 across Britain.  In England 80% of people felt strongly English, while 82% felt strongly British.  In Scotland, 84% felt strongly Scottish, 59% strongly British.  Viewed the other way round, few people anywhere in Britain feel \u2018not at all\u2019 British.  The same is true for Englishness and Scottishness, although fully 1 in 4 people in Wales do not feel at all Welsh.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shared labels may mask sharp differences.  What might appear to be the same national identity seems to work in different ways in different places. Research<\/a> (available without paywall here<\/a>) by the Future of England Survey team (@Ailsa_Henderson, Charlie Jeffery and @DanielWinc, @RWynJones) shows that people in England who gave priority to English identity were more likely to vote for Brexit in 2016.  Conversely, the \u2018British\u2019 tended to back Remain in England \u2013 but Leave in Scotland.  Leaver voters in Northern Ireland were almost certain to identify as British. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Brexit is not necessarily best viewed as an English project.  Its symbols (the Union Flag) and language (the word Brexit itself) invoke Britain.  In \u2018How Brexit was Made in England\u2019 we wrote that academic analysis too often oversimplify, the \u2018complexities of a state with four component parts \u2026 into \u2018British politics\u2019\u2019.   The same is true of public debate.  We bracket out NI, treat Scotland and Wales special interests (@ThatsDevolved) and hide England within Britain or the UK (#sayEngland). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

People take different views about Brexit as an ultimate objective.  But as Brexit processes become \u2018curiouser and curiouser\u2019 they seem set to explode the comfortable myth of \u2018the UK as a fictive country: Anglo-Britain\u2019.  Politicians and commentators who face up to the complex multi-national realities of the UK will serve us all best in the long term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This article was first published on The Centre for Constitutional Change<\/a><\/em> and is reproduced here with permission. <\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Brexit is not necessarily best viewed as an English project. Daniel Wincott says it’s time for politicians and commentators to face up to complex multi-national realities of the UK. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":236,"featured_media":3417,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[125],"tags":[141,40],"class_list":["post-8122","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics","tag-democracy","tag-devolution"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8122","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/236"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8122"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8122\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3417"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8122"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8122"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8122"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}