{"id":16601,"date":"2024-11-12T16:47:50","date_gmt":"2024-11-12T16:47:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/?p=16601"},"modified":"2024-11-12T16:47:52","modified_gmt":"2024-11-12T16:47:52","slug":"the-eu-and-uk-under-trump-2-0","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/2024\/11\/the-eu-and-uk-under-trump-2-0\/","title":{"rendered":"The EU and UK under Trump 2.0"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Almost a week after Donald Trump\u2019s election victory, are European leaders any clearer on their strategic reaction to the ever-deteriorating geopolitical environment and the implications of his victory?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Or, amidst EU divisions on a range of issues, is the EU \u2013 not very strategically \u2013 just waiting to see how bad Trump 2.0 proves to be?<\/p>\n

After the flurry of congratulations from European leaders, the day after US voters went to the polls (November 6), the weak and problematic German governing coalition collapsed.\u00a0Then, on the Thursday evening after a European political Community meeting , the EU leaders had their own informal summit and issued a declaration<\/a>, leadenly entitled: \u201cBudapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal\u201d. EU leaders may not be expected to comment frankly on how bad they fear Trump 2.0 will be for the EU and internationally. But at a time of conflict, instability, uncertainty, and climate and biodiversity crises, this declaration certainly ranks as underwhelming.<\/p>\n

It begins: \u201cFaced with new geopolitical realities, and economic and demographic challenges, we, the Leaders of the European Union, are determined to ensure our common economic prosperity, boost our competitiveness, making the EU the first climate-neutral continent in the world and ensuring the EU\u2019s sovereignty, security, resilience and global influence.\u201d<\/p>\n

The leaders go on to emphasise 12 key action points suitable to the current state of the world of which the first is: \u201cIntensifying our efforts to ensure a fully functioning Single Market.\u201d Those in the UK who hope that Trump\u2019s victory may lead to a more rapid and substantive rapprochement with the EU may find this emphasis on the single market a little inadequate to the current state of the world.<\/p>\n

Setting aside informal summit declarations, was there any more light from the press conference held by the European Council president, Charles Michel, after the leaders\u2019 dinner? Michel declared <\/a>the EU\u2019s willingness to strengthen transatlantic ties. But he knows, as we know, this is not what\u2019s about to happen. He then concedes, the closest to frankness we get, that on bilateral trade and investment relations: \u201cThis is a challenge.\u201d<\/p>\n

Michel goes on to touch on the major crises and conflicts of Ukraine and the Middle East. These conflicts he declares require: \u201cmore dialogue and more efforts to make sure that we defend our common interests.\u201d This is deliberately vague meaningless waffle. The EU has, and has had, no influence on the US support for Israel\u2019s decimation of Gaza \u2013 whether the US president is Biden or Trump. The EU has its own divisions on Gaza that have left it sidelined and still, in many ways, complicit.<\/p>\n

What now?<\/h2>\n

The EU\u2019s leaders are especially worried at the impact of the looming Trump presidency on EU and US support for Ukraine. They\u2019re worried about their own defence too and how Trump will engage with NATO. They know Trump is expected to withdraw from the Paris climate deal and to promote fossil fuels. How and whether American democracy will fare under Trump 2.0 is a wider concern. And, unsurprisingly given the EU\u2019s top concern with its competitiveness and single market, they know Trump is likely to impose tariffs on the EU\u2019s exports to the US (even if below the reported 60% level he will aim for with China).<\/p>\n

The EU is not in the best of states to cope with this swerve into a populist, far-right US president. Germany is facing early elections \u2013 with its own far right currently doing better in the polls than all three parties in the disbanded governing coalition. In France, President Macron has just over two years left of his mandate \u2013 and no mandate in the Assembl\u00e9e Nationale<\/em> after this summer\u2019s elections. The European Parliament now has a quarter of its MEPs coming from far-right parties \u2013 and the Parliament\u2019s centre-right, the European People\u2019s Party, seems willing on some issues to work with the far-right.<\/p>\n

On migration and asylum-seekers, the EU has shifted steadily over the last several years towards the positions of far right parties. If and when Trump starts to deport illegal migrants, the EU is not going to be in much of a position to talk about human rights or treating migrants and asylum-seekers with respect.<\/p>\n

On climate change, the EU has been better \u2013 the EU\u2019s Green Deal a vital positive strategy. But Ursula von der Leyen, starting her second term as Commission president, weakened key sustainability reforms in the agricultural sector in order to ensure her re-appointment. And she has gone along with EU leaders in putting competitiveness and security ahead of the EU\u2019s climate leadership (a leadership anyway in doubt as the EU currently looks like failing to meet its 2030 climate targets).<\/p>\n

On trade, the EU will have to decide how to respond to Trump imposing tariffs \u2013 presumably by mirroring them but looking for some more positive way through rather than an ever deeper trade war.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s an old saying that the EU is always at its best, or makes most progress, in a crisis. But the EU\u2019s current weakness, in the increasingly unstable global context, does not suggest that sort of optimism is appropriate.<\/p>\n

And the UK?<\/h2>\n

Where does the UK fit into all of this? To some extent as an after-thought. The UK is still a large economy by European standards and its support for Ukraine is significant. Perhaps, the EU and UK will manage to cooperate more closely on climate change. Possibly, they will ease a few trade barriers between them. But will the EU and UK be able to support Ukraine enough, if the US weakens or removes its support? The EU should, minimally, be accelerating Ukraine\u2019s EU accession process but this is not going to happen (and the UK has no influence here). And while Germany and the UK continue to supply arms to Israel, as the destruction continues and famine stalks the north, there is no pan-European consensus on how to end Israel\u2019s Middle East wars, nor any European influence either.<\/p>\n

Some hope that Trump 2.0 may accelerate the UK\u2019s return to the EU fold, or at least encourage a more substantive approach than Keir Starmer has shown so far. Perhaps a return to the EU\u2019s single market, for instance?<\/p>\n

But Starmer gained his massive majority on a small share of the vote. His sights are already set on the next election in 2029. There is nothing to suggest he would re-open Brexit divisions \u2013 divisions that are, anyway, essentially within England not pan-UK. And UK politics are not remotely in a settled and calm enough state to suggest that, in the highly unlikely case that the UK government suddenly decided to undo Brexit and ask to re-join the EU, the EU would be remotely interested.<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s re-election has, in just a week, worked to shine a very harsh light on the EU\u2019s current political and strategic weakness \u2013 and that too of the UK. Serious European political leadership is needed that recognises the deep instability of our times. But muddling through is more likely the order of the day. And leadership may have to come from elsewhere.<\/p>\n

First published on the author\u2019s Europe & Scotland Newsletter<\/a> on Substack<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A week after Trump\u2019s election victory, the EU – and wider Europe including the UK – look weak and uncertain. Muddling through is not going to be enough in an increasingly unstable, conflict-ridden and climate-damaged world.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":4514,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[196],"tags":[122,30],"class_list":["post-16601","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-environment","tag-brexit","tag-europe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16601","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16601"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16601\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4514"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16601"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16601"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sceptical.scot\/staging\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16601"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}